The Myawaddy region in Myanmar has long been regarded as a lawless zone for telecommunications fraud and human trafficking in Southeast Asia.
So far, the joint anti-fraud operations by China, Myanmar, and Thailand have repatriated over 7000 people.
However, Su Chi Du, the leader of the Karen Border Guard, who controls the core area of telecom fraud in Myawaddy, still appears carefree in front of the media.
Although the Thai police have proposed multiple times to arrest Su Chi Du, the resolution has been indefinitely delayed in Thailand due to "certain reasons."
The situation in Myanmar is even more complicated, as the Myanmar government currently lacks the capability and authority to take any action against Su Chi Du, who dominates the region.
The issue with Su Chi Du is not just a personal matter but involves cross-border crackdowns, economic interest chains, and complex issues within Myanmar's internal factions.
Su Chi Du, as the de facto controller of the Karen Border Guard, a local armed force in Myanmar, has long exploited jurisdictional loopholes along the Thai-Myanmar border to evade accountability.
Many friends may wonder why the Myanmar government cannot directly arrest Su Chi Du?
In fact, although nominally under the Myanmar military government, Su Chi Du's army operates completely independently.
The Myanmar military government has limited control over him, and it is impossible for them to arrest Su Chi Du.
If the Thai police wish to arrest him across the border, they need approval from the Myanmar military government, and the relationship between the Myanmar military and the Karen Border Guard is delicate.
They themselves do not have the capability to enter the Karen State controlled by Su Chi Du, let alone cooperate with Thailand to carry out the arrest.
Even if the Myanmar military government agrees to let the Thai police enter its territory to carry out the arrest.
Thailand would still struggle to execute an effective operation.
The Karen Border Guard has amassed substantial funds through telecom fraud parks, supporting thousands of armed personnel.
They have formed a "state within a state" independent of the Myanmar and Thai governments.
Even though Thailand has criminal evidence and enters Karen State, it is difficult for Thailand to break through their military defenses to carry out the arrest.
Although Thailand cannot directly arrest Su Chi Du, it does not mean there are no ways to deal with him.
Su Chi Du's controlled Myawaddy is adjacent to Mae Sot District in Thailand, geographically forming a "no-man's land."
Su Chi Du rents out land to telecom fraud parks, creating an economy dependent on cross-border crime.
In early February, Thailand intensified its crackdown, implementing policies to "cut off internet, electricity, and fuel" at the border, but Su Chi Du still maintains the operation of the parks with diesel generators and underground networks.
Su Chi Du can "evade the law" due to his deep ties with the criminal network.
The telecom fraud parks bring substantial annual income to the Karen Border Guard, used for armed maintenance and local construction, forming a cycle of "crime nourishing the army, the army protecting crime."
The parks lure citizens from multiple countries through fake recruitment, forcing victims to engage in telecommunications fraud or human trafficking, with the Karen Border Guard extracting rent and commissions.
After investigations, the Thai police discovered that several Sino-Thai joint ventures had assisted in transporting victims, showing that their "dark hands" have reached abroad.
Su Chi Du also has connections with criminal groups in multiple Southeast Asian countries. In earlier years, She Zhi Jiang, a Malaysian Chinese leader who has been arrested, had collaborated with him on the "Asia Pacific New City" project.
As mentioned earlier, the Thai police have proposed more than once to issue an "arrest warrant" for Su Chi Du.
However, the Thai Attorney General's Office has repeatedly postponed the approval of the arrest warrant, citing the need for "additional evidence from abroad," while the Myanmar military government has neither the willingness nor the capability to cooperate with the investigation.
Even if the arrest warrant is approved, Thailand cannot directly arrest Su Chi Du.
In response to the Thai police's repeated intentions to issue an "arrest warrant" against him, Su Chi Du has become uneasy,
If the Thai side really approves the "arrest warrant," even if they can't catch him immediately, it's still a "sword hanging over his head." Who knows when it will fall.
Recently, Su Chi Du defensively stated in a high-profile media interview that he "only provides land leasing," and he is completely unaware of what the land is used for.
He also took the opportunity to pressure the Thai government to resolve the issue of accommodating over 7000 stranded individuals.
Although the joint action by China, Myanmar, and Thailand has achieved phased results, with Myanmar handing over more than 7000 telecom fraud personnel to Thailand and China repatriating citizens in batches, and Thailand setting up over 5000 checkpoints to curb cross-border crime,
these actions mainly target the lower-level executors, while the core leaders are still protected.
The recent arrest of 10 suspects involved in the abduction of Chinese actor Wang Xing is just a "small role" in Su Chi Du's telecom fraud empire.
The real issue is that the Myanmar military government, in order to counterbalance other rebel armed forces within the country, has long tacitly allowed the existence of the Karen Border Guard.
While China and Thailand can only pressure the Myanmar government to strengthen joint actions against telecom fraud, the possibility of directly intervening with local armed forces is extremely low.
To completely destroy Su Chi Du's telecom fraud empire is not impossible.
1. Economic blockade: Track Su Chi Du's money laundering routes and freeze his overseas assets.
Currently, the Thai Anti-Money Laundering Office has intervened in the financial system of telecom fraud in the Thai-Myanmar border area and has begun monitoring the region.
2. Regional joint defense: China, Thailand, and Myanmar should establish a normalized joint law enforcement mechanism, such as sharing intelligence and unifying arrest standards, to avoid acting independently.
3. Public pressure: Expose Su Chi Du's dual role (claiming to "fight fraud" while actually condoning crime), weaken his local credibility, and prompt the Myanmar military government to sever ties with him.
The end of Su Chi Du may be similar to the "Four Big Families" in northern Myanmar. Once external pressure exceeds internal protection, his seemingly stable criminal empire will crumble.
However, before that, patience and strategy in international cooperation are crucial.
